ABSTRACT Median filtering is one of the most common operations for image smoothing and retouching, and it is often used as a post-processing by forgers to alleviate the traces of image tampering. Hence, if the traces of median filtering can be found in an image, this image is highly suspected. In this paper, we proposed an adversarial network for median filtering detection in RGB images. Our detection framework can be divided into three parts. To overcome the previous limitations of median filtering detection in gray-scale images, we first extract the dark channel residual in RGB images for suppressing the interference of content. Second, we merge several dark channel residual together by multi-scale fusion to better characterize the statistic traces left by different filter sizes. Third, we explore a generative adversarial network to improve the robustness and enhance the statistical difference between original images and median filtered images. Our method is extensively evaluated in several publicly available data sets. The experimental results present an obvious improvement compared with other competitors. Particularly, the proposed framework obtains better performances in the case of the small blocks with JPEG compression.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of image editing software, it becomes easier and easier for a non-expert to modify an image. As a consequence, many potential problems arise, such as copyright infringements, authenticities of judicial evidence. To fight against the forgers with ulterior motives, a number of image forensic methods have been proposed by researchers during the last decade [1] , [2] . By analyzing the traces left by a certain operation, many forensic approaches have been reported, e.g. resampling detection [3] , [4] , copy-move detection [5] , [6] , camera model identification [7] , [8] , JPEG compression [9] , [10] , and contrast enhancement [11] , [12] . Recently, some methods for general image manipulation detection also draw increasing research attention [13] , [14] .
Among all the forensics tasks, median filtering detection has attracted research attention for years in the image forensics community. As a common image post-processing technique, median filtering is a nonlinear operation that is used for image denoising and smoothing while preserving edge information. To make the forgery look realistic, forgers usually apply median filtering after tampering process for destroying the statistical traces and the evidence of tampering. Median filtering is an anti-forensic method to decrease the reliability of forensic tools, e.g. resampling detection [15] and JPEG compression detection [16] .
Many antecessors have made great efforts on median filtering detection. Yuan [17] observed that median filter significantly modified the order and the quantity of the gray levels. They extracted the median filtering forensics (MFF) feature set and achieved robust performance on JPEG images. Chen et al. [18] presented a reliable forensic scheme by constructing two feature sets, such as Global Probability Feature set (GPF) and Local Correlation Feature set (LCF). Kang et al. [19] exploited the autoregressive (AR) model to describe the novel feature set of the median filter residual (MFR) .
In recent years, due to the booming development of deep learning techniques, some work based on deep learning is proposed to detect median filtering. To restrain the interference of image content, Chen et al. [20] added a median filter residual (MFR) layer in front of the convolutional neural networks (CNNs) obtaining state-of-the-art performance compared with other traditional median filtering detection methods. Tang et al. [21] built the connection between the nonlinearity in median filtering operation and the nonlinearity in neural networks by the mlpconv layer. Liu et al. [22] designed a median filtering detection scheme by calculating the frequency-domain feature called the annular accumulated points (AAP).
To jointly suppress the content interference and extract effective manipulation traces, Bayar and Stamm [14] explored a constrained convolutional layer for general forensic method. In the paper [13] , Li et al. pointed out that most pixel values will be changed during many kinds of image operations. They employed a compact feature set to characterize the correlation of local pixels in residual domain. The effectiveness of [13] is verified by detecting 11 types of image operations, including median filtering. Cozzolino et al. [23] indicated that a set of residual-based descriptors can be regarded as simple constrained convolutional neural networks (CNN), which supports the previous research on residual-based and CNN-based median filtering detection.
Although median filtering detection has been studied for years, existing approaches are still suffering from several limitations. First, most of the previous median filtering detection methods aim to detect median filtering in gray-scale images, which means the prior knowledge in RGB image can hardly be exploited. However, RGB images are widely used in practice because of their rich information compared with gray-scale images. Second, the performance of existing median filtering detection methods decreases greatly when they are used for detecting small blocks or JPEG compressed images. Nevertheless, when we aim to detect a patch in an image, e.g. copy-move, we will face a small block inevitably. In most cases, images are stored in JPEG format.
To overcome these shortcomings in previous literature, we proposed our adversarial framework for median filtering detection. Based on extensive experiments and analysis, we observe that median filtering strongly affect the dark channel prior of natural images. A set of feature maps in the residual domain are fed into an adversarial network. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We proposed an adversarial network for median filtering detection. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first to employ GANs to perform multimedia forensics.
• Unlike previous work, we extend median filtering detection into RGB images. The prior knowledge in natural images is applied for median filtering detection.
• Extensive experiments are implemented in several public datasets under different circumstances, showing competitive results, especially when we aim to detect the small size and JPEG images. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related work. In section III, we formulate the framework and present the detection algorithm. Extensive experimental results with various parameters are presented in section IV. Finally, we conclude our paper and outline the future work in section V.
II. RELATED WORK A. GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS
In recent years, a number of methods based on Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have been proposed for a board scope of applications, e.g., image generation [24] - [27] , image editing and manipulation [28] - [31] , super resolution [32] , [33] , video synthesis and estimation [34] - [36] . Fig. 1 shows an example of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). In the adversarial setting [37] , a generative model G and a discriminative model D are trained simultaneously. The generator G maps the input of a noise vector z ∼ P noise (z) to the output image X fake = G(z). Either a generated image X fake or a real image X real ∼ P data (X ) is taken as the input of the discriminator D. The discriminator outputs a single scalar which denotes the probability that input with a distribution P data rather than data generating distribution P G . By maximizing the classification possibility of the input, the discriminator D can be trained successfully. The generator G is obtained by maximizing the probability of D making a mistake. The model can be learned by jointly solving the objective loss function as follow:
This learning process encourages G to output images with distribution close to P data (X ). The discriminator D will be fooled by the generator G. As a consequence, D can not identify the real images eventually. After the training process, G can be neglected, while D is kept for classification.
B. AUTO-ENCODERS
Auto-encoders are effective methods for high-level structured feature representation in unsupervised learning [38] . Practically speaking, auto-encoders are neural networks that aim to minimize the reconstruction error of input and output. For the last few years, it has been widely used for learning a generative model [39] , [40] .
As illustrated in Fig. 2 , auto-encoders are composed of three components: an encoder, a hidden representation, and a decoder. Specifically, the encoder network converts the input x ∈ R D 1 into latent representation h ∈ R D 2 which is a set of compact code computed by:
where
is an element-wise nonlinear function, and is also the active function of encoder. Ideally h can preserve discriminative features of inter-class samples in a common space. To reconstruct the input x, the decoder projects the hidden representation h to the outputx by:
where W 1 , b 2 and δ 2 (·) denote the weights, the biases and the active function of the decoder, respectively. It is expected that the decoder can reconstruct the input with a minimal error [41] . By minimizing the average reconstruction error, the parameters of auto-encoders := {W 1 , b 1 , W 2 , b 2 } can be learned by:
This optimization can be solved by gradient descent. In many cases, the input layers and the output layers have the same size. In practice, we usually assume W 2 is the transpose of W 1 , which reduces the number of independent variables. If δ 1 and δ 2 are linear activation functions, auto-encoders can be viewed as principal component analysis (PCA). If δ 1 and δ 2 are nonlinear activation functions, auto-encoders can represent multi-model features of the input [42] .
C. DARK CHANNEL PRIOR
He et al. [43] proposed an effective prior for single image haze removal based on the statistical properties of natural images. They observe that in most of the local patches without haze, some pixels often have very low intensity and even close to zero in at least one channel of RGB color channels. These pixels are denoted as dark pixels. Given an RGB image I , we use I dark to represent the dark channel of I , and it is defined as follow:
where I c represents a color channel of I , d (x) is a local block centered at x with the size of d × d. Calculated by two minimum operations min y∈ d (x) and min c∈{r,g,b} , the dark channel is defined as the minimum of all pixels in a block in RGB three channels. According to [43] , the dark channel value I dark (x) trends to be zero in most cases.
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The proposed median filtering detection framework consists of three parts: feature extraction by Dark Channel Residual, multi-scale fusion, and generative adversarial networks. The detailed descriptions are illustrated in the following subsections.
A. DARK CHANNEL RESIDUAL
In our preliminary experiments, we observe that GANs can not achieve competitive results when the median filtered images are taken as input directly. Since the content of images will strongly affect the slight traces of tampered images, forensic methods based on deep learning should be designed by suppressing content interference while maintaining the statistical forensic properties. Inspired by [20] , we also observe that residual domain feature set has a better representative ability for median filtering detection. We denote the proposed feature set as Dark Channel Residual (DCR), which is defined as follow:
where I dark test (x) represents the dark channel value of a test image, I dark med (x) denotes the dark channel value of a median filtered image.
B. MULTI-SCALE FUSION
Clearly, median filtered images obtained by different filter size have different statistical properties. It is critical to design a general feature set for most common filter size. Based on our review of previous median filtering detection, filter sizes are often set as 3 × 3, 5 × 5, and 7 × 7. Intuitively, we can adjust the window size in dark channel extraction to adapt the changes of filter size. By switching the dark channel sizes, we merge three different residuals of dark channel into to an M × N × 3 matrix, where M and N are the sizes of images.
C. GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS
The generative adversarial networks in proposed framework consist of two parts: generation network G, and discrimination network D. The network G generates X to reconstruct its input X 0 and tries to deceive D so that it can not identify the reconstructed images from the original images. Ideally, G will be trained to reconstruct the distribution of the original images efficiently. The discriminator D is expected to reject the reconstructed images. To characterize the distribution of original images, these two networks play an adversarial game in training process. Since the networks G and D are both learned by the distribution of the original images, a tampered image will break the balance of these two neural networks. Gaussian noise is added to the training images to make our VOLUME 6, 2018 method more robust. The detailed description is listed in the following.
1) G NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
Inspired by the previous research in video forensics [44] , we assume the reconstruction error of an auto-encoder trained on the original images is a useful feature set for image forensics. The reconstruction error of tampered images would be high, since tampered images have different statistical distribution compared with original images. Motivated by this idea, our network uses the reconstructed images to train the discrimination network.
In the G network, we train a decoder-encoder Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) by the DCR of original images to formulate random input images to the natural image DCR statistic distribution. As a consequence, G can reconstruct the images which have a similar distribution as the original DCR with a minimum error. However, it can hardly reconstruct DCR of tampered inputs. Moreover, G enhances the distribution of DCR of original images. It would become easier for D to identify the tampered one from the test dataset. Finally, G learns the statistical distribution in the DCR of original images. The input of G is reconstructed by that distribution.
After we calculate the DCR, the first convolution layer of encoder convolves them with 64 kernels of size 5 × 5 × 3. Then the second convolutional layer takes the output of the first layer as the input and filters it with 128 kernels of size 5×5×64. The third layer uses 256 filters with size 5×5×256 to create a hidden layer with size 5 × 5 × 256 × 512. The decoder uses 256 kernels with size 5×5×512 in the first layer. The second layer of decoder consists of 128 filters with size 5 × 5 × 256. The third layer contains 64 filters with size 5 × 5×128. The final output of this auto-encoder is defined as X . As a common way to increase the stability of the network, we use a batch normalization after each convolutional layer instead of any pooling layers in this network.
2) D NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
The network D is composed of several convolution layers for identifying the tampered images. The discriminator D outputs the possibility of its input following the distribution p X in the DCR of original images. Hence, the output of D can be regarded as an authenticity score for the tampered input. The first layer of D is built by 64 filters with size 5 × 5 × 3. The second layer consists of 128 kernels with size 5 × 5 × 64. The third layer and the fourth layer are 256 filters with size 5 × 5 × 128, and 512 filters with size 5 × 5 × 256.
3) ADVERSARIAL TRAINING PROCESS
Goodfellow et al. introduced the conception of adversarial learning for two networks as we illustrated in section II-A. According to this way, we train the two neural networks in an adversarial setting. We assumeX = X + is the input X with added Gaussian noise . The input X follows the distribution p X , and the Gaussian noise follows the normal distribution N σ with the standard deviation σ . The Gaussian noise is added to the input images to make G more robust. As we defined before, p X is the assumed distribution of the DCR of the original images. The generator G maps theX to X with the distribution p X .
On the other hand, D is trained on the distribution of p X . As a result, D outputs the possibility of G(X ) follows p X or not. Our networks can be jointly trained by optimizing the following function:
We formulate L 1 as the loss function of the joint neural network. In addition, we need the output of the auto-encoder G to be as close as the DCR of the original input images. Another loss function is added on the output of the generator G:
where X is the input, X is the reconstructed DCR, · 1 is the l 1 norm. Eventually, the neural network is optimized by minimize the following loss function:
where α ∈ R + is a balance parameter that controls the weight of the terms in loss function. 
Update the discriminator by ascending its stochastic gradient:
end for 8: Sample a batch of m noise samples { 1 , . . . , m } from noise prior N σ ;
9:
Update the generator by descending its stochastic gradient:
11: end for

IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we elaborate the details of our experiments. We first describe the experimental setup. This is followed by performance evaluation, including the scenarios of uncompressed images and JPEG compressed images. 
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
As the previous literature indicates, the performance of forensic tools may vary significantly across different datasets. For this reason, we establish our experiments on several widely used image databases. Our composite image database containing 5,000 images, which are from five widely used image databases: BOSSbase 1.01 Database [45] , UCID Database [46] , BOSS RAW Database, Dresden Image Database [47] , NRCS Photo Gallery Database. In our experiments, 80% of the database is used for training, and the remaining 20% is used for testing. The balance parameter α is defined as 0.5 in Eq. (9) . To tamper the original images, we carry out median filtering operation in RGB three channels respectively and then merge them together to create a median filtered RGB image. The method proposed by Pan et al. [48] is used to implement the dark channel extraction. 1 We compared our model with the baselines using the detection accuracy (AUC), sensitivity (Recall) and F1 measure:
where P is the number of positive samples, N is the number of negative samples, TP represents the number of samples correctly classified as positive samples, and TN denotes the number of samples correctly classified as negative samples. The implementation is using the TensorFlow framework. The machine used in our experiments includes an NVIDIA TITAN GPU. The presented experimental results represent the average of 5 trials.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this subsection, we first present the difference of dark channel in original images and dark channel in tampered images. Then, we show quantitative results in uncompressed images and JPEG compressed images.
1) DARK CHANNEL COMPARISON
As the first module, feature extraction plays an important role in our algorithm. In this subsection, we illustrate how median filtering destroys the dark channel prior in natural images. As we mentioned in section II-C, the dark channel prior is widely used for image processing. In most original images, at least one channel contains a minimum pixel value in a local patch. The minimum pixel value usually tends to be zero in most cases. However, when median filtering operation applied to original images, the zero pixel value will definitely disappear. As we all know, median filtering is extremely effective in salt-and-pepper noise removal. In the same way, median filtering will strongly affect the dark channel prior. The residual of the dark channel in an original image and a median filtered image is a persuasive evidence for median filtering detection.
The comparisons of dark channel in original images and median filtered images are shown in Fig. 3 . We randomly select 4 images from UCID dataset, and then cut them into 256 × 256. Median filtering operation with filter size 3 × 3 is applied to these images. We compressed these tampered images using JPEG compression with quality factor 90. Obviously, the dark channel maps of original images are ''darker'' than tampered images in Fig. 3 .
We also compare the statistical distribution of the DCR in original patches and tampered patches. As illustrated in Fig. 4 , the DCR of median filtered blocks are more likely to be zero. The horizontal axis represents the pixel value and the vertical axis is the number of pixels. Blue represents original patches, and red represents tampered patches.
2) QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we compare our method with several stateof-the-art detection algorithms in the previous literature. Four methods are chosen as our baseline: MFF [17] , GLF [18] , AR [19] and CNN-based [20] . Our experimental setting mainly focuses on the situation of JPEG compression and small block size. One of the most important shortcomings of the previous median filtering detection method is their poor performance in JPEG compression and small block. The images are usually stored in JPEG format. When we face copy-move detection, a filtered image may locate in a patch of an image.
For our baseline, we convert the tampered RGB images to gray-scale images as the same experimental protocol in their methods. For our own method, we extract the DCR feature set of original images and median filtered images. After the feature extraction, the multi-scale fusion module is followed. Finally, the fused feature set is taken as the input of our GANs model.
As presented in Table 1 , ''JPEG70'' and ''JPEG90'' denote the JPEG compression with quality factor 70 and 90 respectively. ''MF3'' and ''MF5'' represent 3 × 3 and 5 × 5 median filtering. As we can see from the table, our method's performances are better than any other methods when the block size is set to 32 × 32. Our performance does not degenerate greatly when the JPEG quality factor decreases. When the median filtering operation is applied to image patches, the lowest pixel value definitely changes. The tampered blocks will no longer obey the dark channel prior in natural images. Therefore, DCR is an effective feature set for median filtering detection. On the other hand, it is difficult to improve the performance when the block size is set to 64×64, since the performance of some median filtering detection methods is really competitive. For further evaluation, we also compared the Recall and F1-score for each method as shown in Fig 5-8 . Our method obtains better performance.
V. CONCLUSION
Median filtering detection is a popular research topic in passive-blind multimedia forensics community. The investigators can use median filtering detection to fight against antiforensic techniques.
In this paper, we proposed a novel image median filtering detection method by dark channel prior extraction and generative adversarial networks. To fill the vacancy of RGB image median filtering detection, we exploit the dark channel prior knowledge in natural RGB images. Multi-scale fusion is applied to generalize the detection ability for different sizes of median filters. In the classification process, we introduce the generative adversarial networks to replace the previous SVM-based classification. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to detect median filtering in RGB images. The experimental results support the effectiveness of our algorithm, especially in the case of small blocks under JPEG compression.
In the future, we plan to combine the dark channel prior with the nonlinear property together to detect median filtering in gray-scale images. The usage of maxout unit may be a promising method for this mission since the previous research in image dehaze has already demonstrated the connection between dark channel prior and maxout unit. 
